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Abstract 
 A variety of studies suggest that a high need for closure – that is, a desire for knowledge which is 
clear, stable, and unambiguous, as opposed to confusing or uncertain – may be associated with greater 
hostility toward relevant outgroups.  Using international attitudes as our context, we examine the 
hypothesis that the relationship between the need for closure and support for military action against Iraq 
may be both moderated by identification with the national ingroup.  Specifically, we expected this 
relationship to be moderated by nationalism (i.e., an aggressive form of identification based on a desire 
for national dominance) but not patriotism (i.e., a more neutral love of one’s country).  Our data provided 
a clear pattern of support for this hypothesis, and additional analyses indicated that a high need for closure 
reduced variability about the use of force among the highly nationalistic, but not the highly patriotic. 
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On 21 March 2003, the United States and several allies embarked on what became known as 
―Operation Iraqi Freedom,‖ in an effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power and eliminate the threat 
posed by his regime’s suspected possession of weapons of mass destruction.  In doing so, the United 
States and its allies ended almost a year of speculation about the likelihood and timing of a second war 
with Iraq, but its actions did not end a growing controversy both at home and abroad about the 
appropriateness of such a war.  Events following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government – including 
the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction whose suspected presence had been used to justify the 
war and an ongoing guerilla war against American troops – have fueled this controversy even further.  
Naturally, public-opinion analysts have devoted a great deal of attention to understanding why people 
both in the US and elsewhere have gravitated toward one side of this controversy or the other.   
In this study, we explore this issue further, focusing on two variables which have not received as 
much attention, namely, individual differences in cognitive style and the extent and nature of people’s 
attachments to the United States.   While a large body of research in intergroup relations suggests that the 
mere salience of an ingroup-outgroup distinction can lead to stereotyping and in-group favoritism, a 
variety of studies suggest that this tendency may be stronger among individuals with a high need for 
cognitive closure – i.e., a desire for knowledge which is clear, stable, and unambiguous, as opposed to 
confusing or uncertain – ultimately leading to a stronger preference for dealing aggressively with 
outgroups  (Golec, 2002; Golec & Federico, in press; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 
1977; Shah, Kruglanski & Thompson, 1998).  This suggests that support for dealing with Iraq in an 
aggressive fashion may correlate with a high need for closure.  More generally, however, the relationship 
between a high need for closure and ―hawkish‖ responses to conflict may not be as simple or direct as this 
account suggests.  We argue that the relationship between the need for closure and aggressiveness toward 
outgroups depends not only on the degree to which a person identifies with a particular ingroup, but also 
on whether or not the form of that person’s identification with the group implies negativity toward 
outgroups.  In the analysis which follows, we examine this possibility in the context of attachment to the 
Need for closure and attitudes toward Iraq – 4   
national ingroup and attitudes toward military action against Iraq.  However, we begin by taking a closer 
look at research on the interface between the need for closure and intergroup attitudes.   
Need for Cognitive Closure and Intergroup Attitudes 
As noted above, research suggests that the need for closure may be a particularly important 
antecedent of intergroup hostility (e.g., Golec, 2002; Golec & Federico, in press; Shah et al., 1998; see 
also Kruglanski, Shah, Pierro & Mannetti, 2002; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Importantly, individual 
differences in the need for closure relate to the amount and quality of information processing during 
opinion formation and the certainty and rigidity with which the resulting opinions are held (Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  People under a heightened need for closure experience 
discomfort in the face of uncertainty, and are motivated to reduce this discomfort as quickly as possible.  
They do this by seizing on whatever cognitive cues and information are available, in order to formulate a 
clear opinion on initially-ambiguous issues. However, when they have already formed an opinion, they 
are motivated to protect the closure it provides them with.  As a result, they express great confidence in 
their judgments and develop opinions which resist change even in presence of disconfirming information. 
On the other hand, uncertainty is not as aversive for people under a low need for closure.  They are 
motivated to process information thoroughly and are less prone to ―seize and freeze‖ on the judgments 
suggested by whatever cues happen to be immediately present in a given context. As a result, their 
perceptions tend to be more complex and less stereotypical.  Alternative views are welcomed, since they 
may improve one’s understanding of new situations. 
In intergroup contexts, tendencies associated with a high need for closure may lead to stereotyped 
modes of perception and a relatively heuristic information processing style, ultimately resulting in a 
preference for conflict-escalating attitudes and behaviors (Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O’Brien, 1995; 
see also Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).  For example, research on the need for closure and information 
processing in negotiation suggest that negotiators under a high need for closure are more likely to be 
influenced by stereotypical information about the opposing party’s behavior and characteristics, which 
can lead to perceptions of one’s opponents as inherently and inflexibly aggressive.  Negotiators under a 
Need for closure and attitudes toward Iraq – 5   
high need for closure are also less likely to engage in systematic information processing and are more 
susceptible to the use of simple us-versus-them cues, making them less likely to see the conflict from 
perspectives other than own (a necessary prerequisite for cooperation; De Dreu, Koole & Oldersma, 
1999).  
The tendency for a high need for closure to be related to intergroup hostility becomes even clearer 
when the subjective meaning of such hostility is considered.  Ingroup bias and hostility toward outgroups 
reinforces a simple view of the world in which the ingroup is right and outsiders are wrong, and it avoids 
the tedious, closure-delaying process of having to square the outlook and interests of the ingroup with 
those of the outgroup (Shah et al., 1998; see also Bar-Tal, 1998;  Golec & Federico, in press; Kruglanski 
et al., 2002; Wallbaum, 1993).  The ultimate goal of prevailing over one’s opponents also suggests a 
finality and certainty consistent with the desires of those high in the need for closure (Jost et al., 1999, 
2003; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  So, while a hostile stance may have 
the potential for counterproductive and even destructive consequences, it may also provide group 
members with a kind of epistemic satisfaction.  Ceteris paribus, this satisfaction may attract people with a 
high need for closure to hostile approaches to conflict, particularly under the stressful conditions typical 
of many conflicts (Golec, 2002).  
However, other studies have suggested that the need for closure may also motivate intergroup 
hostility by increasing one’s reliance on norms and behavioral cues associated with salient ingroup 
identities.  Along these lines, Shah, Kruglanski, and Thompson (1998) demonstrate that a high need for 
closure is significantly associated with positive in-group evaluations, and in turn, with negative 
evaluations of relevant outgroups.  They argue that social groups are an important source of easily 
accessible cognitive cues, which may be particularly helpful when group members need to form a firm 
opinion in an uncertain situation.  In this respect, the consensually-validated definitions of reality afforded 
by group membership may be particularly attractive to individuals with a high need for closure, providing 
them with a sense of confidence, order and stability which might not otherwise be available.   
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Most of this research on the relationship between the need for closure and intergroup hostility has 
been done in the context of evaluative responses to ethnic groups and artificial, lab-based groups (e.g. 
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Shah et al., 1998).  Nevertheless, the logic of this research suggests that the 
need for closure may be an important antecedent of attitudes toward international conflicts, including the 
one examined here.  If individuals under a high need for closure are more likely to seize and freeze on 
salient group identities in order to provide themselves with a stable source of epistemic and normative 
cues, then we might expect them to adopt a more aggressive, ―group-centric‖ approach to the Iraq issue.  
Since individuals high in need for closure may be attracted to approaches which appear to enhance the 
security of the national ingroup and wary of approaches which require them to take the perspective of and 
cooperate with ―outsiders‖ (cf. Golec, 2002; Jost et al., in press; Shah et al., 1998), a hawkish stance may 
be more capable of providing them with the sense of order and stability they desire.   
However, this general tendency for the need for closure to relate to aggressive responses to 
potential conflict – particularly in the international context – may also depend on the degree to which 
individuals psychologically identify with the groups they are nominally a member of (Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  In other words, despite their general tendency to rely on whatever 
cues are available, individuals under a high need for closure may not seize and freeze on cues related to a 
particular group identity unless it is important to them.  This suggests that identification with the national 
ingroup may moderate the relationship between need for closure and ―hawkish‖ attitudes toward the 
resolution of the Iraq issue: a high need for closure may be associated with an aggressive stance only 
among those identify strongly with the national ingroup.   
Two Types of Identification with the National Ingroup: Patriotism Versus Nationalism 
The relationship between the need for closure and attitudes toward military action against Iraq 
may thus be contingent on identification with the national ingroup.  However, existing research also 
suggests that identification with the national ingroup may not be a unitary dimension.  More precisely, a 
variety of studies have distinguished between national attachment in the form of patriotism and national 
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attachment in the form of nationalism (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendoorn, 
2003; Feshbach, 1994; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sidanius et al., 1997; Viroli, 1995).   
So, what are the basic elements of this distinction?  Patriotism is typically defined as love for and 
pride in one's nation which is not accompanied by antipathy toward other national outgroups (Feshbach, 
1994; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Viroli, 1995). It is associated with loyalty toward and concern for 
one's national group. It assumes a positive evaluation of the national ingroup, but it does not exclude 
criticism of its vices and failures (Blank & Schmidt, 2003), and they are able to criticize their nation if it 
does not meet certain standards in these domains and others.  While patriotism is an affirmation of the 
national ingroup that does not rest on the devaluation of other groups, nationalism can be thought of as a 
form of ethnocentrism that combines positive feelings toward the national ingroup with hostility toward 
other national groups.  It is typically associated with negativity towards foreign countries and foreigners 
living within one's own country. Moreover, it involves a desire for competition, national superiority, and 
dominance over other nations (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). Rather than honestly appraising their country, 
they idealize it and react vehemently to any criticism of it. 
Thus, not all forms of identification with the national ingroup may normatively imply hostility 
toward outsiders. Put another way, nationalism and patriotism may vary in the degree to which they are 
associated with a hostile ―conflict schema.‖  In general, a conflict schema is a set of ideas defining what 
kinds of situations may be regarded as conflicts and what the most desirable ways of dealing with such 
conflicts are (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989; Golec & Federico, in press).  On one hand, nationalism 
may be very strongly linked to a conflict schema that implies competitive and hostile attitudes toward 
other nations.  This is clearly suggested by recent conceptual and philosophical treatments of the construct 
(e.g., Feshbach, 1994; Viroli, 1995), which have highlighted its emphasis on perceptions of national 
superiority.  Empirical research has also strongly linked the construct to variables associated with 
dominance and aggressiveness in the intergroup sphere, such as social dominance orientation and support 
for ideologies of racial and ethnic superiority (Sidanius et al., 1997; see also de Figueiredo & Elkins, 
2003) and generalized militarism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).  On the other hand, patriotism – a 
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simple love of country – may not be clearly tied to a particular conflict schema.  In some cases, it may 
even imply a conflict schema prescribing a more positive and cooperative approach toward other nations.  
Accordingly, most studies indicate that patriotic attachment to the national ingroup is not related to 
hostility toward other nations or ―outsiders‖ within one’s own nation  (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; 
Feshbach, 1994; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sidanius et al., 1997; Viroli, 1995). 
Thus, national identification may not always result in adherence to an aggressive conflict schema.  
If so, then our basic hypothesis about the moderating effect of national attachment needs to be qualified.  
More precisely, if only one dimension of national attachment – namely, nationalism – implies hostility 
toward other nations, then the ―seizing and freezing‖ tendency associated with a high need for closure 
may result in hawkish attitudes toward the Iraq issue among the highly nationalistic, but not necessarily 
among the highly patriotic.  This qualification suggests that the relationship between the need for closure 
and hawkishness may be moderated by nationalism but not by patriotism.  More precisely, we might 
expect this relationship to be stronger among the highly nationalistic, since a high need for closure may 
have the effect of increasing one’s reliance on the competitive schema associated with nationalism.   
Moreover, this may not be the only way in which the need for closure and national attachment 
interact.  Previous work suggests that individuals under a high need for closure also tend to seize and 
freeze on whatever their dominant attitudinal response is, causing them to display a greater amount of 
certainty in their opinions (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).   This suggests that highly nationalistic 
individuals with a high need for closure may also be more rigid and less variable in their attitudes toward 
the Iraq issue, as well as being more hawkish.  As we have seen, research suggests that nationalists tend to 
possess an unambiguously hostile conflict schema that predisposes them to an aggressive approach to 
international conflict across a variety of situations.  In other words, nationalists may vary less with regard 
the content of their conflict schemas and their willingness to apply that content across contexts.  If this is 
the case, then the seizing-and-freezing tendency associated with the need for closure may lead nationalists 
to converge even more closely on a hawkish position, leading to policy attitudes which are more 
uniformly aggressive (i.e., less variable). 
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However, things may be very different among those who reject nationalism.  In particular, we 
might expect these individuals to experience more conflict when making judgments about the 
appropriateness of military action against Iraq.  At the simplest level, while nationalists may fixate on the 
dominance-related constructs at their heart of their conflict schemas when making judgments about 
foreign-policy issues, individuals who are low in nationalism may simply bring a wider range of 
considerations to bear on their judgments (cf. Zaller, 1992).  For example, one individual low in 
nationalism may focus on the humanitarian costs of war when making judgments about the Iraq situation, 
leading them to oppose military action, while another individual low in nationalism may focus on the 
humanitarian costs of leaving a brutal dictator in power, leading them to support military action.  In any 
case, the wider range of considerations used by individuals low in nationalism may lead those with a high 
need for closure to seize and freeze on considerations with different implications for the Iraq issue.  This 
suggests that the need for closure may be related to increased variability in respondents’ attitudes toward 
the Iraq issue among those low in nationalism.     
 Thus, we expect a high need for closure may be associated with decreased variability in attitudes 
toward military action among the highly nationalistic and increased attitude variability among those low 
in nationalism.  But what about the role of patriotism?  As we have seen, patriotism does not appear to be 
clearly linked to a particular conflict schema or to particular international attitudes.  If patriotism does not 
imply something specific for individuals to seize and freeze on when making foreign-policy judgments, 
then it may be largely irrelevant to the relationship between the need for closure and variability in 
responses to international conflict.  As such, we do not expect an interaction between the need for closure 
and patriotism with regard to attitude variability. 
In the analyses which follow, we examine each of these hypotheses about the antecedents of 
people’s attitudes toward the use of military force against Iraq.  At the most basic level, we expected that 
a high need for cognitive closure would be more strongly associated with support for military action 
against Iraq among those high in nationalism, but not necessarily among those high in patriotism.  
Moreover, in order to more thoroughly map out the interactive effects of the need for closure and various 
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forms of national attachment, our examination of national attachment as a moderator also looked at the 
interactive effects of the need for closure and nationalism on the variability of one’s opinions about the 
use of force against Iraq.  More precisely, we used a heteroskedastic regression procedure to test the 
hypothesis that the need for closure would be associated with less error in the prediction of hawkishness 
from the need for closure, but only among those whose attachment to the national ingroup implied a 
definite preference for aggressiveness, i.e., the highly nationalistic.   
Method 
Respondents 
 Respondents were 217 undergraduates at a large Midwestern university, surveyed in the fall of 
2002.  The data were collected during a period in which the possibility of military action against Iraq was 
an active topic of discussion, both on the campus in question and in the nation as whole.  However, data 
collection occurred well before military action against Iraq was actually initiated on 21 March 2003.  
Respondents were surveyed in two sessions: in an upper level social science class and a lower level social 
science class. The sample included 83 first-year students, 59 second-year students, 35 third-year students, 
3 fourth-year students, and 11 students in their fifth year or higher; fourteen students failed to indicate 
what year they were in.  The mean age was 19.6., and there were 123 men and 89 women, with ten 
respondents failing to report their gender.   
Measures 
 Four key variables were assessed: (1) nationalism, (2) patriotism, (3) support for military action 
against Iraq, (4) and need for closure.  Several control measures – including the respondent’s research 
session, gender, political awareness, ideology, and party identification –  were also used in the analyses.1  
Descriptions of these measures, listed in order of their actual presentation in the survey, are given below.  
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for the four key variables are shown in Table 1. 
 National attachment.  In line with our hypotheses – and with previous work on the structure of 
national attachment (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sidanius et al., 1997) – two different dimensions 
of national attachment were assessed: nationalism and patriotism.  The items used to measure each of 
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these constructs were answered a seven-point response scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).    Nationalism was assessed using five items: (1) ―The more the U.S. actively influences 
other countries, the better off these countries will be,‖ (2) ―The U.S. should not dominate other countries‖ 
(reverse-coded), (3) For the most part, America is no more superior than any other industrialized country 
in the world‖ (reverse-coded), (4) To maintain our country’s economic superiority, aggressive economic 
policies are sometimes necessary,‖ (5) ―To maintain our country’s superiority, war is sometimes 
necessary.‖  All items were coded such that higher scores indicated higher levels of nationalism, and they 
were averaged to form a scale (α=.75).  Patriotism was measured using five items: (1) ―I am proud to be 
an American,‖ (2) ―I find the sight of the American flag very moving,‖ (3) ―Every time I hear the national 
anthem, I feel strongly moved,‖ (4) ―The symbols of the United States (e.g. the flag, Washington 
monument) do not move me one way or the other‖ (reverse-coded), (5) ―I have great love for my 
country.‖  All items were coded such that higher scores indicated higher levels of patriotism, and they 
were averaged to form a scale (α=.91). 
 In order to test the assumption that these two sets of items correspond to two different dimensions 
of national attachment, two confirmatory factor-analytic models were estimated using LISREL.  
Consistent with our assumptions, maximum-likelihood estimation revealed that a two-factor model – with 
the nationalism and patriotism items specified to load onto separate but correlated factors – fit the data 
better than a single-factor model.  While the sample size was large enough to produce a significant chi-
square for both models (χ2(34) = 133.51, p<.01, for the two-factor model, and χ2 (35) = 192.32, p <.01, 
for the single-factor model), other tests pointed toward the superiority of the two-factor model.  In this 
vein, the comparative fit index – which is less sensitive to sample size and model complexity – indicated 
an adequate fit for the two-factor model, CFI = .91.  In contrast, the fit of the single-factor fell below 
conventional levels of adequacy, CFI = .86.  Moreover, a chi-square difference test indicated that the 
addition of a second factor provided a highly significant improvement in fit, Δχ2 (1) = 58.81, p<.00001. 
Support for military action. Respondents’ approval of military action against Iraq—our primary 
dependent variable—was indexed using six items, each answered on a seven-point response scale: (1) 
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―Should the United States rely on diplomatic pressure to contain Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, or 
should it take military action to force Saddam from power?‖ (1—diplomatic solution to 7—military 
action); (2) ―Should the United States take military action against Iraq fairly soon, or should the U.S. wait 
and give the United Nations more time to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq?‖ (1—take action soon to 
7—give U.N. more time) (reverse-coded); (3) ―Is the United States justified in taking ―preventive‖ 
military action against possible threats from Iraq, even if Iraq does not attack the United States or its allies 
first?‖ (1—preventive action justified to 7—preventive action is not justified) (reverse-coded); (4) ―If the 
United States takes military action against Iraq, do you think it will help stabilize the situation in the 
Middle East, or do you think it would make the situation in the Middle East more unstable?‖ (1—will 
help stabilize Middle East to 7—will make Middle East less stable) (reverse-coded); (5) ―If the United 
States takes military action against Iraq, do you think the threat of terrorism against Americans at home or 
abroad would be reduced, or do you think an attack on Iraq would increase the threat of terrorism against 
Americans?‖ (1—reduce threat to 7—increase threat) (reverse-coded); (6) ―If the United States takes 
military action against Iraq, do you think it will further American interests in the Middle East, or do you 
think it would generate more problems for America in the region in the long run?‖ (1—further American 
interests to 7—generate more problems) (reverse-coded).  Higher scores indicated greater levels of 
support for military action against Iraq (α=.90). 
Need for closure. Need for closure was measured using the 42-item Need for Closure Scale 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  All items were answered a seven-point response scale, ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  Responses to the items were all coded such that higher scores 
indicated a higher need for closure, and averaged to form a composite (α=.85). 
 Other controls.  Five other controls were also included.  Three of these were quite general.  A 
research session dummy variable was included to account for possible differences between the upper level 
(coded 1) and lower level (coded 0) social science classes in which the data were collected.  A dummy 
variable corresponding to respondents’ gender (0 = female, 1= male) was also included, since a number of 
analyses have suggested that men are reliably more likely to favor the use of military force in 
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international disputes and be generally dominance-oriented in inter-group situations (e.g., Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999).  Political awareness, or one’s overall level of cognitive engagement in politics (e.g. Zaller, 
1992), was assessed using seven items measuring political knowledge and media use.  Five items 
measured political knowledge: (1) ―What percentage vote of Congress is needed to override a veto by the 
president (a bare majority, two-thirds, three-fourths, 90%)‖; (2) ―Do you happen to know which party has 
the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington?‖; (3) ―Do you happen to know which 
party has the most members in the Senate in Washington?‖; (4) ―Whose responsibility is it to nominate 
judges to the Federal Courts? (the President, the Congress, the Supreme Court)‖; (5) ―Who is currently 
vice president of the U.S.?‖  Each of these items was scored on a 0/1 basis, with a score of ―1‖ given for  
correct answers and a score of ―0‖ given for incorrect or ―don’t know‖ responses.  Two items measured 
media use: (1) ―How often do you use television news to get political information?‖ (1—everyday to 5—
never); (2) ―How often do you use newspapers to get political information?‖ (1—everyday to 5—never).  
Scores on the five factual items were summed and divided by 5 in order to create a single 0 to 1 scale of 
political knowledge.  Similarly, each of the media-use items was reversed and put on a 0 to 1 scale by 
subtracting 1 from each respondents’ item responses and dividing by 4.  An overall political awareness 
scale was created by averaging respondents’ scores on the knowledge scale and the two media-use items.  
Higher scores indicated greater levels of political awareness (α=.66; M = .66, SD = .21). 
 Two political predispositions were also considered.  Ideology, or respondents’ self-placement 
along the general left-versus-right dimension of political belief, was measured using two items: (1) ―How 
would you describe your political outlook with regard to economic issues?‖ and (2) ―How would you 
describe your political outlook with regard to social issues?‖  Both items used a seven-point response 
scale, ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative).  Responses to these two items were averaged 
to form a composite.  The higher the score, the greater the level of conservatism (α=.84; M = 3.60; SD = 
1.50). Party identification was assessed using a single item: ―How would you describe your political party 
preference?‖  This item used a seven-point response scale, ranging from 1 (strong Democrat) to 7 (strong 
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Republican).  Higher scores indicated greater levels of identification with the Republican Party (M = 
3.60; SD = 1.88).
2
 
Results 
 Looking first at the inter-correlations shown in Table 1, we find basic support for the idea that a 
high need for closure should be associated with various dimensions of national attachment and hawkish 
foreign-policy attitudes.  In this regard, need for closure was positively correlated with patriotism, 
nationalism, and support for military action against Iraq (all ps<.001).  Moreover, the correlations also 
suggest that nationalism was more strongly associated with support for military action (r = .69, p<.001) 
than patriotism was (r = .56, p<.001), t(213) = 3.14, p<.01 (two-tailed), consistent with earlier work on 
the distinction between these two dimensions of national attachment (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1997).    
Interactive Effects of the Need for Closure and National Attachment 
 In order to take a more detailed look at the relationships between these variables – and examine 
the hypothesis that a high need for closure would be associated with hawkish attitudes only among those 
high in aggressive, dominance-oriented forms of national attachment – we conducted a series of 
hierarchical ordinary least-squares regressions.  In these models, support for military action against Iraq 
was regressed on need for closure, patriotism, nationalism, and the two-way interactions between need for 
closure and patriotism and need for closure and nationalism.  Four other variables – gender, a dummy 
variable for the research session, ideology, and party identification – were included in each model as well.  
In order to guard against possible heteroskedasticity problems, HC3 robust standard errors were used in 
these analyses (see Long & Ervin, 2000).    
 The results of these analyses are shown in Table 2.  Model 1 simply looked at the effects of need 
for closure, research session, and gender.  As expected, need for closure was positively related to support 
for military action.  Gender was also associated with support for military action, with men showing more 
hawkish attitudes.   To these predictors, Model 2 added ideology, party identification, and the two 
dimensions of national attachment – patriotism and nationalism.  The estimates for this model are shown 
in the middle column of Table 2.  Consistent with the idea that the relationship between need for closure 
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and hawkish foreign policy attitudes may be mediated by these other political predispositions (see Golec 
Federico, Cislak, & Dial, 2003), the net effect of need for closure was actually reduced to non-
significance in this model (i.e., p>.10).  Moreover, both ideology and party identification were positively 
associated with hawkishness, although the only effect of ideology reached significance.  Finally, both 
dimensions of national attachment were positively associated with hawkish attitudes toward Iraq.  
However, as expected, the net effect of nationalism (b = .56, p<.001) was far stronger than the net effect 
of patriotism (b = .13, p<.05).  Confirming this pattern, running Model 2 with patriotism and nationalism 
constrained to have effects of equal intensity significantly reduced the overall fit of the model (i.e., 
ΔF(1,190) = 11.43, p<.001).      
 However, our main interest was in how the relationship between need for closure and hawkish 
foreign-policy attitudes may depend in different ways on each of the two dimensions of national 
attachment.  In order to address this question, Model 3 added the Need for Closure x Patriotism and Need 
for Closure x Nationalism interactions to the overall model.  As predicted, these estimates indicated that 
need for closure interacted significantly with nationalism but not patriotism.  Confirming this pattern, 
running Model 3 with the two interactions constrained to equality again reduced the overall fit of the 
model (i.e., ΔF(1,188) = 3.85, p<.05).  In order to probe the significant interaction, we computed simple 
slopes for the relationship between need for closure and support for military action at nationalism levels 
one standard deviation above (high) and below (low) the variable’s mean, using Aiken and West’s (1991) 
method.   These analyses indicated that the relationship between need for closure and hawkishness was 
significant and positive at high levels of nationalism (b = .57, p<.01), but non-significant and negative at 
low levels of nationalism (b = -.20, p>.10).  Interestingly, simple-slope analyses examining the 
relationship between need for closure and hawkishness at different levels of patriotism indicated a trend 
in the opposite direction:  i.e., need for closure was positively associated with hawkishness among those 
low in patriotism (b = .31, p<.05) but not those high in patriotism (b = .05, p>.10).  These two patterns of 
interaction are displayed in Figure 1; the ―low‖ and ―high‖ values for each variable are one standard 
deviation below and above that variable’s mean, respectively (see Aiken & West, 1991). Thus, as 
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expected, a high need for closure was more likely to be associated with more hawkish foreign-policy 
attitudes among individuals high in forms of national attachment that imply a normative commitment to 
aggressive ways of dealing with international conflict.
3
 
Need for Closure, National Attachment, and Variability in Attitudes Toward Military Action         
 In addition to suggesting that the need for closure and certain dimensions of national attachment 
may interact to predict attitudes toward the use of military force, our hypotheses also suggest that a high 
need for closure may be associated with reduced variability among those high in nationalism, suggesting 
decreased ambivalence, and increased variability among those low in nationalism, suggesting higher 
levels of ambivalence.  Patriotism, on the other hand, should be largely irrelevant.  A statistical test of this 
hypothesis can be obtained by looking at whether the need for closure interacts with either of the national-
attachment dimensions to predict variability in respondents’ attitudes toward military action against Iraq.  
In order to do this, we borrowed a econometric procedure known as  heteroskedastic regression.   This 
procedure allows the error variance of the dependent variable – as well as scores on the dependent 
variable itself – to vary systematically as a function of several independent variables.  In a regression of 
this sort, two equations are simultaneously tested using maximum-likelihood estimation: a mean equation, 
which predicts actual scores on the dependent variable; and a variance equation, which models the 
implicit error variances associated with these predicted scores (Greene, 2003; Harvey, 1976).
4
  Thus, in 
contrast to traditional ordinary least-squares regression, which assumes that the errors of prediction are 
constant across levels of the independent variables included in the mean equation, heteroskedastic 
regression actually parameterizes these errors as a function of a second set of independent variables. 
Naturally, the implied error variance associated with a given predicted value will be larger when 
respondents’ scores on the dependent measure are more variable, making it useful proxy for response 
variability.  Since a higher level of response variability suggests greater intra-attitudinal conflict (Alvarez 
& Brehm, 1997, 2002;  Zaller, 1992), estimates from the variance model can be used as an indirect 
indicator of the degree to which respondents with certain scores on the independent variables in the 
variance equation are conflicted with regard to the attitudes measured by the dependent variable.  As 
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such, this method has been used to explore the antecedents of ambivalence about a number of social and 
political matters, including abortion and racial policy (for a review, see Alvarez & Brehm, 2002) and the 
affective content of Whites’ perceptions of Blacks (e.g., Federico, 2004).       
In the present context, the mean equation was specified to contain the same predictors as the 
regression shown in Model 3 from Table 2.  Following standard heteroskedastic-regression practice (e.g., 
Alvarez & Brehm, 2002), the variance equation was specified to include only those variables theoretically 
and empirically relevant to the variability of respondents’ attitudes toward military action against Iraq.  
Since research session and gender were assumed to be relevant only to the magnitude of respondents’ 
scores on the dependent variable (i.e., via different political norms across classes and gender-based 
differences in social dominance), these two variables were not included in the variance equation.  
However, since previous studies suggest that political awareness may have an impact on ambivalence and 
intra-attitudinal conflict in the political domain (e.g., Alvarez & Brehm, 2002; Zaller, 1992), we added 
this variable to the variance equation.  
Unstandardized estimates for this analysis are shown in Table 3.  Looking first at the mean 
equation, the results simply confirm the ordinary least-squares regression findings reported above: need 
for closure interacted with nationalism but not patriotism to predict mean support for military action.  
However, the estimates for the variance equation are of greater interest here.  First of all, a likelihood-
ratio test for heteroskedasticity
5
 rejected the null hypothesis of constant error variances: with 8 degrees of 
freedom, this test generated a χ2 value of 24.26, which was significant (p<.01).  In turn, the actual model 
estimates indicate that need for closure interacted with nationalism to predict error variance in expected 
support for military action.  In contrast, need for closure did not interact with patriotism in this model.  
Again, simple slope analyses were used to probe this interaction.  Among those low in nationalism, need 
for closure was associated with increased prediction error with regard to support for military action (γ = 
1.32, p<.01).  However, among those high in nationalism, it was associated with less prediction error with 
regard to support for military action (γ = -1.36, p<.01). Thus, these results suggest that a high need for 
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closure is associated with reduced variability among those high in nationalism and increased variability 
among those low in nationalism.   
Discussion 
 An emerging body of research suggests that individuals under a high need for cognitive closure 
may be particularly prone to aggressiveness (e.g., Golec, 2002; Golec & Federico, in press; Jost et al., 
2003; Shah et al., 1998).  This is often attributed to the fact that individuals under a high need for closure 
are more likely than others to rely on cues linked to membership in various groups.  Here, public debate 
over the appropriateness of using force against Iraq provided us with a unique context in which to explore 
the relationship between the need for closure and aggressiveness in the domain of international affairs.  
We argued that the relationship between the need for closure and support for military action against Iraq 
may be moderated by the degree to which individuals psychologically identify with a relevant ingroup – 
in this case, the national ingroup.  However, we also argued that effects of this sort may not be associated 
with all forms of national attachment.  Instead, only those forms of identification with the national 
ingroup which apply a confrontational ―conflict schema‖ to international relations may be implicated in 
the relationship between the need for closure and hawkish attitudes toward Iraq.  With regard to this issue, 
we suggested that nationalism would moderate the relationship between the need for closure and 
hawkishness, but that patriotism – a simple love of one’s country – would not.  
Our data provided a strong pattern of support for this basic hypothesis.  Adding another 
dimension to this finding, a heteroskedastic regression analysis suggested that the need for closure was 
associated with greater certainty in one’s opinions on the use of force against Iraq – or more concretely, 
with less error variance in the prediction of attitudes toward the use of force – only among the highly 
nationalistic.  Among those who rejected nationalistic sentiments, a high need for closure was actually 
associated with less certainty about the use of force.  Moreover, patriotism had little or no moderating 
effect on the relationship between the need for closure and variance in the degree to which attitudes 
toward the use of force could be predicted without error, further suggesting that patriotism is not clearly 
connected to any particular conflict schema.  On the whole, what these results suggest is that the need for 
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closure will be associated with a more reliable tendency to converge on hostile strategies when one’s 
mode of identification implies a definite preference for models of international relations that emphasize 
aggression and dominance.  When these attachments are actively rejected, people may bring a wider 
range of considerations to bear on their policy judgments, causing the need for closure to polarize 
people’s opinions and increase the variability of their attitudes.  On the other hand, forms of national 
attachment which have fewer implications for attitudes toward outgroups – such as patriotism – may have 
little or no moderating effect with regard to variability in people’s preferences, since neither a high or a 
low level of attachment would have definitive implications for what those with a high need for closure are 
likely to seize and freeze on.   
In sum, then, our results both reinforce and extend the notion of a relationship between 
―epistemic motivations‖ like the need for closure and a hostile orientation toward intergroup relations (see 
Golec, 2002; Golec & Federico, in press; Golec, Federico, Cislak, & Dial., 2003;  Shah et al., 1998; see 
also Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).  Above all, they underscore the complexity of this relationship.  While 
some treatments of the connection between need-for-closure-related constructs and intergroup hostility 
have focused on stereotyping and a general preference for simplicity and finality as mediators of this 
relationship (e.g., Schaller et al., 1995), recent work places a stronger emphasis on the tendency of high-
need-for-closure individuals to seize and freeze on salient worldviews or identities in their quest for 
definite reference points (e.g., Shah et al., 1998).  According to the perspective we have developed here, it 
is the fact that a high need for closure may have both of these effects which suggests that the traditional 
prediction of a simple, positive relationship between the need for closure and aggressive attitudes toward 
conflict may need to be qualified.  In this respect, one of the key questions is what happens when the 
orientation a person seizes and freezes on suggests a relatively cooperative approach to political conflict.  
In circumstances like this, the two tendencies associated with a high need for closure – namely, a 
preference for simplistic, seemingly closure-producing attitudinal responses and a heightened tendency to 
fall back on dominant conflict schemas – may not push conflict-related attitudes in the same direction.  
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More precisely, while a preference for simplicity may have the typical effect of promoting aggressive 
attitudes, a stronger tendency to rely on a  relatively cooperative conflict schema might suppress them.  
Consistent with this argument, studies have suggested that the need for closure may interact with 
various political identifications in order to shape conflict-related preferences, such that a high need for 
closure is more strongly associated with an aggressive orientation to intergroup relations among 
individuals who belong to political groups whose conflict schemas are highly competitive (Golec & 
Federico, in press; see also Jost et al., 1999).  The results reported here take this finding one step further.  
Not only do they demonstrate that one’s level of identification with a certain group may affect the 
relationship between the need for closure and attitudes toward intergroup conflict, but they also show that 
different types of identification with the very same group may have very different effects on this 
relationship.  Nationalistic identification with the national ingroup – which typically implies the 
acceptance of a competitive conflict schema – is associated with a stronger relationship between need for 
closure and hawkishness in the international sphere, while patriotic identification with the national 
ingroup – which does not imply a competitive orientation toward international conflict – is not.   
Thus, our results suggest that the relationship between the need for closure and intergroup 
hostility may depend on the nature of an individual’s identification with his or her ingroup. While we find 
these results compelling, we would like to conclude with a few caveats.  Above all, given the correlational 
nature of the data used here, we cannot draw firm conclusions about the causal mechanisms implied by 
our analysis.  While most research on national attachment suggests that broad identifications like 
nationalism and patriotism constrain specific international attitudes, such as opinions about the use of 
force in particular conflicts (rather than vice versa; see de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Feshbach, 1994; 
Sidanius et al., 1997), we cannot definitively address the question of directionality using the present data.
6
  
Finally, we should also note that our conclusions are based on data taken from a student sample.  
Nevertheless, studies which have looked at the effects of various dimensions of national attachment in 
both student samples and adult samples taken from the general population have found no important 
differences in the antecedents and consequences of nationalism and patriotism across these two types of 
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respondents (Sidanius et al., 1997; see also Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  While we thus have no reason to 
believe that the relationships explored here would be any different in any other sample, we hope to see 
our findings replicated in adult samples.    
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Notes 
 
1
 Besides the measures described in this section, the survey contained ten additional items: (1)  
five items measuring generalized militarism and (2) five items measuring the degree to which the US 
should have sought support from other countries before taking military action against Iraq.  These items 
were included in the survey for analysis in a different study (Golec, Federico, Cislak, & Dial, 2003), and 
they are not considered here. 
 
2
 Research on political attitudes tends to conceptualize ideology and party identification as 
separate predispositions, despite their correlation (Sears, 1993; Zaller, 1992).  As such, they were kept 
separate in the analyses which follow.  However, when the two ideology items and the one party 
identification items were averaged to create a single political-orientation scale (α=.85), use of this 
measure in place of the separate indices did not change any of the substantive results reported below. 
 
3
 Recent work suggests that the need for closure may be bound up with a number of other 
predispositions – such as political conservatism – that allow individuals to manage fear and uncertainty 
through support for the status quo, conventional ideas, and a robust defense of the ingroup and its 
prerogatives (e.g., Jost et al 1999, 2003).  This argument suggests that the need for closure may be more 
strongly related to support for military action among individuals for whom fear and insecurity are 
―normative‖ responses, i.e., those on the political right.  While this hypothesis was not our primary focus, 
we did examine it in an additional regression.  This analysis added product terms for the Need for Closure 
 Ideology and Need for Closure   Party ID interactions.  Neither of these interactions reached 
significance (b = -.13, for Need for Closure  Ideology; b = .09, for Need for Closure   Party ID; both 
ps>.30).  Moreover, the Need for Closure   Nationalism interaction remained significant (b = .27, p<.05) 
and the Need for Closure   Patriotism interaction remained non-significant (b = -.08, p>.10), confirming 
our original findings.  Taken together, these results suggest that strictly political predispositions have little 
or no moderating role once the interactions between the need for closure and the two dimensions of 
national attachment are accounted for. 
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4
 The variance equation for an analysis of this sort takes the following general functional form 
(Greene 2003; Harvey 1976): 
 izi eVar )(       (1) 
where εi is the error term for the mean equation, zi is a vector of observations on the independent variables 
in the variance equation, and γ is the vector of coefficients for the variance equation. The likelihood 
function for the overall analysis takes the following general form: 
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This function was estimated using the program STATA. 
 
5
 This likelihood ratio test took the following form (Alvarez & Brehm, 1997): 
 SH LLLR  2      (3)  
where LH is the log-likelihood for the full heteroskedastic regression model and LS is the log-likelihood 
for a null model in which the variance equation contains only the constant.  This statistic is evaluated 
against the chi-square distribution, with a degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables included in 
the variance equation for the full model.  
6
 Nevertheless, in a somewhat different context, analyses by de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003)  
using a variant of two-stage least-squares regression deal somewhat with the possibility of reciprocal 
effects by correcting for the effects of simultaneity in the prediction of policy attitudes from nationalism 
and patriotism.  More specifically, they found that the relationship between nationalism and attitudes 
toward immigrants – and the lack of a relationship between patriotism and this dependent variable – was 
robust to functional forms which corrected for the relationship between these two predictors and the 
residual variance in attitudes toward immigrants.   
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Key Variables 
 
 Descriptives Intercorrelations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 
 
1.  Nationalism 
2.  Patriotism 
3.  Support for military action 
4.  Need for closure  
 
3.91 
4.99 
3.31 
4.07 
 
1.17 
1.60 
1.40 
  .57 
 
-- 
.60 
.69 
.24 
 
 
 
-- 
.56 
.25 
 
 
 
-- 
.39 
 
Note.  All coefficients are significant at the p<.001 level. 
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Table 2 
 
Interactive Effects of Need for Closure and National Attachment on Support for Military Action 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictor B SE b B SE b b SE b 
 
Need for closure 
Session 
Gender 
 
 
     .73*** 
     .15 
     .39** 
 
 
(.17) 
(.19) 
(.18) 
 
 
     .17 
    -.04 
     .07 
 
 
(.12) 
(.14) 
(.14) 
 
 
     .18 
    -.05 
     .04 
 
 
(.11) 
(.14) 
(.14) 
Ideology 
Party identification 
Patriotism 
Nationalism 
 
Need for closure x Patriotism 
Need for closure x Nationalism 
 
Constant 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
 
     2.96*** 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
 
(.16) 
     .15* 
    .08 
    .13* 
    .56*** 
 
-- 
-- 
 
   3 .28*** 
(.07) 
(.05) 
(.06) 
(.08) 
 
-- 
-- 
 
(.13) 
    .15* 
   .07 
   .14* 
 .53*** 
     
 -.11  
     .24* 
   
  3.30*** 
 
(.07) 
(.05) 
(.06) 
(.08) 
 
(.09) 
(.12) 
 
(.13) 
 
F (degrees of freedom) 
R
2
 
N 
8.80 (3, 208) *** 
.113 
212 
 
47.59 (7, 190) *** 
.551 
198 
34.18 (9, 188) *** 
.560 
198 
 
 
Note.  Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients and HC3 robust standard 
errors.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.   
+
p<.10.  *p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001. 
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Table 3 
 
Heteroskedastic Regression for the Interactive Effects of Need for Closure and National Attachment on 
Support for Military Action 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
Mean equation 
  
Need for closure 
Session 
Gender 
Ideology 
Party identification 
Patriotism 
Nationalism 
Need for closure x Patriotism 
Need for closure x Nationalism 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
       .13 
       .03 
      -.09 
       .22*** 
       .03 
       .13** 
       .58*** 
      -.09 
       .13* 
 
     3.37*** 
 
 
 
(.12) 
(.12) 
(.13) 
(.06) 
(.05) 
(.05) 
(.07) 
(.06) 
(.07) 
 
(.13) 
 
Variance equation 
 
Need for closure 
Political awareness 
Ideology 
Party identification 
Patriotism 
Nationalism 
Need for closure x Patriotism 
Need for closure x Nationalism 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
    - .02 
    - .34 
     .12 
    - .14
+ 
      .13 
      .06  
      .04 
    - .84** 
 
    .07 
 
 
 
(.25) 
(.57) 
(.11) 
(.08) 
(.09) 
(.13) 
(.19) 
(.27) 
 
(.39) 
 
Log-likelihood 
Wald χ2 (df) 
N 
 
Likelihood ratio χ2 test for  
  heteroskedasticity (df) 
 
 
-256.54 
688.38 (9) *** 
198 
 
24.26 (8) ** 
 
Note.  All coefficients are unstandardized.  Standard errors are given in parentheses.   
+
p<.10.  *p<.05.  **p<.01.  ***p<.001. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Interactions between the need for closure and two dimensions of national attachment. 
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